Unfortunately we are no longer keeping an up-to-date preprint archive on

For more updated pre- and post-prints, you can either browse papers written by Nick on the issues related to Anthropic Bias, or look at some other resources available online.

Below you will find the papers previously listed in the preprint archive of divided into six subtopics:

All entries are available online with open access; if two links are given, then the first is the canonical link and the second an open-access or preprint link.

For related papers on the Simulation Argument, visit

Anthropic reasoning

Anthropic bias: observation selection effects in science and philosophy, Nick Bostrom, 2002.
This book explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by observation selection effects. An explanation of what observation selection effects are has to await chapter 1. Suffice it to say here that the topic is intellectually fun, difficult, and important. We will be discussing many interesting applications: philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes aside, we will use our results to address several juicy bits of contemporary science: cosmology (how many universes are there?), evolution theory (how improbable was the evolution of intelligent life on our planet?), the problem of time's arrow (can it be given a thermodynamic explanation?), game theoretic problems with imperfect recall (how to model them?), traffic analysis (why is the "next lane" faster?) and a lot more - the sort of stuff that intellectually active people like to think about...
"The Mysteries of Self-Locating Belief and Anthropic Reasoning", Nick Bostrom, Harvard Review of Philosophy 11, 2003.
Summary of the difficulties that a theory of observation selection effects faces and a sketch of a solution.
"Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes", Roger White, Noûs 34(2): 260-276, 2000.
White argues, taking up and refining an earlier idea of Ian Hacking's, that the anthropic explanation that seeks to explain why we see a fine-tuned universe by postulating a the existence of a multiverse fails because we must look at the most specific version of the evidence we have, and that is not just that "Some universe is fine-tuned." but that "This universe is fine-tuned." - this latter fact not being one that is made any more probable by the existence of lots of other universes according to White.
"Conflict between anthropic reasoning and observation", Ken D. Olum, Analysis 64(1): 1-8, 2004.
Abstract: Anthropic reasoning often begins with the premise that we should expect to find ourselves typical among all intelligent observers. However, in the infinite universe predicted by inflation, there are some civilizations which have spread across their galaxies and contain huge numbers of individuals. Unless the proportion of such large civilizations is unreasonably tiny, most observers belong to them. Thus anthropic reasoning predicts that we should find ourselves in such a large civilization, while in fact we do not. There must be an important flaw in our understanding of the structure of the universe and the range of development of civilizations, or in the process of anthropic reasoning.
"Prediction and explanation in the multiverse", Jaume Garriga & Alexander Vilenkin, Physical Review D 77: 043526, 2008.
Addresses the reference-class problem (or measure problem) in information-theoretic terms. Abstract: Probabilities in the multiverse can be calculated by assuming that we are typical representatives in a given reference class. But is this class well defined? What should be included in the ensemble in which we are supposed to be typical? There is a widespread belief that this question is inherently vague, and that there are various possible choices for the types of reference objects which should be counted in. Here we argue that the ``ideal'' reference class (for the purpose of making predictions) can be defined unambiguously in a rather precise way, as the set of all observers with identical information content. When the observers in a given class perform an experiment, the class branches into subclasses who learn different information from the outcome of that experiment. The probabilities for the different outcomes are defined as the relative numbers of observers in each subclass. For practical purposes, wider reference classes can be used, where we trace over all information which is uncorrelated to the outcome of the experiment, or whose correlation with it is beyond our current understanding. We argue that, once we have gathered all practically available evidence, the optimal strategy for making predictions is to consider ourselves typical in any reference class we belong to, unless we have evidence to the contrary. In the latter case, the class must be correspondingly narrowed.
"There Is No Adequate Definition of 'Fine-tuned for Life'", Neil A. Manson, Inquiry 43(3): 341-351, 2000.
Argues that the Measure problem has not been solved.
"Anthropic definitions", John D. Barrow, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 24: 146-153, 1983.
Discussion of various types of anthropic principle.
"Observer-relative chances in anthropic reasoning?", Nick Bostrom, Erkenntnis 52: 93-108
Abstract: John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument - a version of the weak anthropic principle - is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie’s thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range of cases, the weak anthropic principle does not give rise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. This finding could be taken to give new indirect support to the doomsday argument.
"Barrow and Tipler on the anthropic principle vs. Divine design", William Lane Craig, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38:389-395, 1988.
Abstract: Barrow and Tipler's attempt to stave off the inference to divine design by appealing to the Weak Anthropic Principle is demonstrably logically fallacious unless one conjoins to it the metaphysical hypothesis of a World Ensemble. But there is no reason for such a postulate. Their misgivings about the alternative of divine design are shown to be of little significance.
"Is the Weak Anthropic Principle Compatible With Divine Design?", Kyle Kelly, 1997.
A response to the above paper by Craig.

Applications of the Anthropic Principle in cosmology

"Self-locating belief in big worlds: Cosmology's missing link to observation", Nick Bostrom, Journal of Philosophy 99(12): 607-23, 2002.
This paper argues that contemporary cosmological theories give probability one to every possible human observation being made. This creates a puzzle: if a theory predicts that every possible observation is in fact made, then how do we test it? What could possibly count as negative evidence? How can we arbitrate between rivalling cosmological theories on empirical grounds? - Only by taking observation selection effects into account, using something like the Self-Sampling Assumption!
"Anthropic bound on the Cosmological Constant", Steven Weinberg, Physical Review Letters 59(22): 2607-2610, 1987.
A classic anthropic argument in cosmology.
"Observation selection theory and cosmological fine-tuning", Nick Bostrom, 481-486 in Universe or Multiverse?, ed. Carr, B.J., 2007, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A concise introduction to observation selection theory and its applications to cosmology, with some discussion of the challenges that arise in the case of infinite spacetimes containing an infinite number of observers.
"Philosophical Implications of Inflationary Cosmology", Joshua Knobe; Ken D. Olum; Alexander Vilenkin, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(1): 47-67, 2006.
Abstract: Recent developments in cosmology indicate that every history having a nonzero probability is realized in infinitely many distinct regions of spacetime. Thus, it appears that the universe contains infinitely many civilizations exactly like our own, as well as infinitely many civilizations that differ from our own in any way permitted by physical laws. We explore the implications of this conclusion for ethical theory and for the doomsday argument. In the infinite universe, we find that the doomsday argument applies only to effects which change the average lifetime of all civilizations, and not those which affect our civilization alone.
"The Beginning of the End of the Anthropic Principle", Gordon L. Kane; Malcolm J. Perry; Anna N. Zytkow, New Astronomy 7:1: 45-53, 2002.
We argue that if string theory as an approach to the fundamental laws of physics is correct, then there is almost no room for anthropic arguments in cosmology. The quark and lepton masses and interaction strengths are determined.
What's the trouble with anthropic reasoning?, Roberto Trotta & Glenn D. Starkman, AIP Conference Proceedings 878: 323-329, 2006.
Argues that the measure problem has not been solved in the particular case of anthropic arguments concerning the Cosmological Constant.
"The significance of numerical coincidences in nature", Brandon Carter, 1967.
5 page postscript appended to transcript (with original figures by photocopy) of 68 page manuscript printed by stencil in 1967 under subheading "The role of fundamental microphysical parameters in cosmogony", as a foundation for what was to become known as the anthropic principle.
"Multiple universes, cosmic coincidences, and other dark matters", Anthony Aguirre & Max Tegmark, Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics, 2005.
Applies anthropic reasoning to predictions about dark matter, and argues that in general anthropic considerations may lead us to expect many as-yet-unobserved 'coincidences'.
"Likely values of the Higgs vev", John F. Donoghue; Koushik Dutta; Andreas Ross; Max Tegmark, 2009.
Applies anthropic reasoning to the Higgs vacuum expectation value.
"Testable anthropic predictions for dark energy", Jaume Garriga & Alexander Vilenkin, Physical Review D 67: 043503, 2003.
Applies anthropic reasoning to make predictions for the dark energy equation of state, for the dark energy density, and for the long-term fate of the universe.
"Inflation, Quantum Cosmology and the Anthropic Principle", Andrei Linde, Science and Ultimate Reality: From Quantum to Cosmos, Eds. Barrow, J.D; Davies, PCW; Harper, C.L., 2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anthropic principle can help us to understand many properties of our world. However, for a long time this principle seemed too metaphysical and many scientists were ashamed to use it in their research. I describe here a justification of the weak anthropic principle in the context of inflationary cosmology and suggest a possible way to justify the strong anthropic principle using the concept of the multiverse.
"Anthropic estimates of the charge and mass of the proton", Don N. Page, Physics Letters B 675(3-4): 398-402, 2009.
Improves on the Carter-Carr-Rees anthropic explanations of the proton charge and mass.
"The Height of a Giraffe", Don N. Page, Foundations of Physics 39(10), 2009.
Estimates the height of the tallest running, breathing organism on a habitable planet.
"Anthropic predictions for neutrino masses", Levon Pogosian; Max Tegmark; Alexander Vilenkin, Physical Review D 71:103523, 2005.
Applies anthropic reasoning to make predictions for neutrino masses.

Applications of the Anthropic Principle in biology

"Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology", Brandon Carter, in Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Data: 291-8, Longair, M.S., 1974, Dordrecht: Reidel.
The anthropic principle, which asserts that what we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as observers, is discussed in relation to several large number coincidences. An illustration is given of the use of the 'strong' anthropic principle, which states that the Universe must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some stage, to predict a priori the weakness of the gravitational coupling constant.
"Must Early Life Be Easy? The Rhythm of Major Evolutionary Transitions", Robin Hanson, 1998.
Uses anthropic considerations to estimate the number of hard steps in human evolution, following an ingenious argument by Brandon Carter.
"Anthropic Shadow: Observation Selection Effects and Human Extinction Risks", Milan Çirkoviç, Anders Sandberg & Nick Bostrom, 2010.
"Anthropic shadow" is an observation selection effect that prevent observers from observing certain kinds of catastrophes in their recent geological and evolutionary past. We risk underestimating the risk of catastrophe types that lie in this shadow.
Bostrom, Nick, "Where are they? Why I hope the search for extraterrestrial life finds nothing", MIT Technology Review, May/June: 72-77, 2008.
Discusses the Fermi paradox, and explains why I hope we find no signs of life, whether extinct or still active, on Mars or anywhere else we may look.
"The Height of a Giraffe", Don N. Page, Foundations of Physics 39(10), 2009.
Estimates the height of the tallest running, breathing organism on a habitable planet.

The Doomsday Argument

These papers relate to the Doomsday Argument, a notorious application of anthropic reasoning which tries to show that we have systematically overestimated the life expectancy of the human species. Apart from the intrinsic interest of this result if it were valid (which I think it is not - see chapter 10 of Anthropic Bias), the argument also provides an important test case for proposed ways of reasoning about observation selection effects.

"The Doomsday argument, Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe", Nick Bostrom, Synthese 127(3): 359-387, 2001.
The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistemology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this assumption. Through a series of thought experiments we then investigate some bizarre prima facie consequences - backward causation, psychic powers, and an apparent conflict with the Principal Principle. (Previous working titles of this paper: "Paradoxes of the Self-Sampling Assumption", "The Doomsday Argument: One Step Nearer the Edge")
"The doomsday argument and the number of possible observers", Ken D. Olum, Philosophical Quarterly 52(207): 164-184 , 2002.
This paper adopts the Self-Indication Assumption as a way out of the Doomsday argument and the Adam-and-Eve conundrums. The author chooses to bite the bullet with regard to the 'Presumptuous Philosopher' objection.
"The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum", Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirkovic, Philosophical Quarterly 53(210): 83-91, 2003.
This paper replies to and criticizes the above paper by Olum, arguing against the Self-Indication Assumption.
"Too soon for doom gloom?", Tomas Kopf; Pavel Krtous; Don N Page, 1994.
Critical remarks on the doomsday argment. Basically, these authors make what I have called the Self-indication assumption (SIA) and show that it cancels the Doomsday argument. This idea seems to have occurred independently to several authors. I believe Dennis Dieks was first, although his original paper didn't explain it very clearly and did not include the calculation showing that the cancellation is exact. None of the proponents of the SIA has yet confronted main objections against this assumption, however.
"The Probability of Doom", Dennis Dieks, 2001.
The Argument is formally valid, but ineffective," writes the author. What he means is that one can adjust the prior probabilities so that the posterior come out normal. True, but those posterior would then have to be in accordance with the Self-Indication Assumption. I'd say that Dieks is a closet supporter of SIA, although he would vigorously deny that. Supporters of SIA have to confront the Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment.
"Critiquing the Doomsday Argument", Robin Hanson, 1998.
Criticisms of the doomsday argument. I think Robin is also committing himself to the Self-Indication Assumption.
Bartha, Paul & Hitchcock, Christopher, "No One Knows the Date or the Hour: An Unorthodox Application of Rev. Bayes's Theorem", Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 66: 329-353, 1999.
Criticism of the doomsday argument based on the "disembodied souls approach" - the self indication assumption once again.
Cirkovic, Milan M., "Is Many Likelier than Few? A Critical Assessment of the Self-Indicating Assumption", 2001.
Replies to some of the arguments given for the Self-Indication Assumption (by e.g. Ken Olum - see paper above).
"An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday ArgumentGott's Line and Leslie's Wedge", Elliott Sober, Synthese 135(3): 415-430, 2003.
This paper attacks both Gott's and Leslie's versions of the Doomsday argument.
"A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument", Paul Franceschi, 2005.
Abstract: In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I present then a two-sided model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA and encapsulates both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt et al.'s models. I argue then that this new analogy also holds when one takes into account the issue of indeterminism and the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.
"The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking", Nick Bostrom, Mind 108(431): 539-50, 1999.
In a recent Mind paper, Kevin Korb and Jonathan Oliver advanced five different objections against the Doomsday argument. I show that all these objections fail.
"Apocalypse Not Just Now", Mark Greenberg, London Review of Books (1 July): 19-22, 1999.
A book review of John Leslie's "End of the World" that contains a criticism of the Doomsday argument.
"A Critical Look at Mark Greenberg's attempted refutation of the Doomsday argument", Nick Bostrom, 2001.
A few brief notes on the above article.
"Beyond the Doomsday Argument: Reply to Sowers and Further Remarks" Nick Bostrom.
In a recent paper in Mind, Sowers tries to refute the Doomsday argument on grounds that true random sampling requires all possible samples to be equally probable the time when the sample is taken. Yet the Doomsday argument does not rely on true random sampling. It presupposes random sampling only in a metaphorical sense. After arguing that Sowers' critique fails, I outline my own view on the matter, which is that the Doomsday argument is inconclusive and that by developing a theory of observation selection effects one can show why that is so.
"Sorting Out the Anti-Doomsday Arguments: A Reply to Sowers", Tom Adams, Mind 116(462): 269-273, 2007.
Another recent response to Sowers.
"The Doomsday Argument without knowledge of birth rank", Bradley Monton, Philosophical Quarterly 53(210): 79-82, 2003.
Tries to show that the Doomsday argument can be applied even when you don't know your birth rank, and that this disables the Presumptuous Philosopher objection against the Self-Indication Assumption. (I reject the view that our having originated from Earth (or whatever unspecified 'region' Monton picks) is a reason to favor T1, unless there is something special about this origin. Everybody find themselves originating from some planet or region, so if the argument worked, everybody would have a reason to favor T1, independely of any particular characteristic of their evidence.)
"No Doomsday argument without knowledge of birth rank: A defence of Bostrom", Darren Bradley, Synthese 144(1): 91-100, 2005.
Critiques the above paper by Monton.
"Predicting future duration from present age: A critical assessment", Carlton M. Caves, Contemporary Physics 41: 143-153, 2000.
This paper criticizes Richard Gott's version of the Doomsday argument. Unfortunately the author seems to be unaware of the more sophisticated Carter-Leslie version, and my own "no outsider requirement". It is when the total number of observers vary between the hypotheses under consideration that strange (interesting!) things begin to happen. See my 'Mysteries' paper above.
"Possible Anthropic Support for a Decaying Universe: A Cosmic Doomsday Argument", Don N. Page, 2009.
I have suggested that one possible solution of the Boltzmann brain problem is that the universe is decaying at an astronomical rate, making it likely to decay within 20 billion years. A problem with this suggestion is that it seems to require unnatural fine tuning in the decay mechanism that would not be explained anthropically. Here it is pointed out that if a spacetime version of volume averaging were used in the cosmological measure problem, this would give anthropic support for an impending cosmic doomsday.

The Sleeping Beauty Paradox

These papers relate to the 'Sleeping Beauty' paradox of self-locating belief. My view is that some of these contributions would have benefited from checking whether proposed solutions make sense when considered in lights of requirements from other domains, e.g. cosmological theorizing. The last chapter of Anthropic Bias applies observation selection theory to the Sleeping Beauty problem and finds that both the 1/2 and the 1/3 view can be accomodated, and which of these views is correct depends on how certain under-determinacies of the original thought experiment are filled in.

"Self-locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem", Adam Elga, Analysis 60(2): 143-147, 2000.
Elga presents an argument for the 'Thirder' view on the Sleeping Beauty problem.
"Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga", David Lewis, Analysis 61(271): 171-176, 2001.
Lewis responds to Elga's paper, defending the 'Halfer' viewpoint.
"Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model", Nick Bostrom, Synthese 157(1): 59-78, 2007.
The Sleeping Beauty problem is an important test stone for theories about self-locating belief. I argue against both the traditional views on the Sleeping Beauty problem (the thirder and the halfer position). I then introduce a new synthetic view, which combines aspects of both these views. I show that, contrary to initial appearances, this synthetic model does not violate Bayesian kinematics.
"Some problems for Conditionalization and Reflection", Frank Arntzenius, Journal of Philosophy 100(7):356-370, 2003.
Abstract: I will present five puzzles that show that rational people can update their degrees of belief in manners that violate Bayesian conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's reflection principle. I will then argue that these violations of conditionalization and reflection are due to the fact that there are two as yet unrecognized ways in which the degrees of belief of rational people can develop.
Vineberg, Susan, "Beauty's cautionary tale", 2004.
Discusses Dutch book arguments in relation to the Sleeping Beauty problem..
"Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs", Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(2): 384-95, 2005.
Argues that we can resolve Sleeping Beauty and other paradoxes by considering the expected squared error of various methods of assigning probabilities. My view on this is that there is a problem in determining the value of this expectation, and that different approaches will calculate different expectations, so that an appeal to the idea that we should minimize expected error is unlikely to resolve the disputes. In a nutshell: it is worse for a method of reasoning to lead to errors in worlds that are more probable than for it to do so in worlds that are less probable. And different methods of reasoning about self-locating belief will assign different probabilities to worlds, and hence disagree about the expected errors that their use would entail.
"A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem", Paul Franceschi, 2008.
Abstract: I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the Entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the Entanglement urn have ontologically different properties form normal ones. In this context, considering a Monday-waking (drawing a red ball) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability. This leads to a two-sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem. On the one hand, the first situation is handled by the argument for 1/3. On the other hand, the second situation corresponds to a reasoning that echoes the argument for 1/2 but that leads however, to different conclusions.
"The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses", Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, Games and Economic Behaviour 20: 121-130, 1997.
The Absent-Minded Driver predates the Sleeping Beauty puzzle and shares some of its puzzling characteristics. The authors summarize and reply to various responses to one of their earlier papers (also published in the same volume) - G&EB vol. 20 is wholly devoted to the Absent-Minded Drivers Paradox).
"A Note On Imperfect Recall", Ken Binmore, Understanding Strategic Interaction. Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten: 51-62, Albers, W. et al.,New York: Springer Verlag, 1996.
Offers some general comments on game theoretic modeling on imperfect recall problem and analyzes an infinitely-repeated version of the Absent-Minded Driver.
"Some "Sleeping Beauty" postings", Nick Wedd (ed.).
Nick Wedd has performed a public service by collecting selected postings on the newsgroup rec.puzzles on the Sleeping Beauty problem, by himself and others, and editing them into an easy-to-read webpage.

Quantum mechanics

These papers relate to quantum mechanics, in particular to the Everett-style interpretations which give a central role to anthropic reasoning.

"The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction", Hugh Everett III, in The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, eds. DeWitt, B. & Graham, R.N., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Hugh Everett III's 1955 Phd dissertation, presenting the original 'no-collapse' interpretation of quantum mechanics.
"Mindless Sensationalism: A Quantum Framework for Consciousness", Don N. Page, Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, 2002.
Presents an Everett-style interpretation of quantum mechanics and discusses its relation to a consciousness in the framework of observation selection effects.
"The Mathematical Universe", Max Tegmark, Foundations of Physics 38(2):101-150, 2008,
This is the "full-strength version" of Tegmark's 'Theory of Everything', which develops the idea that all mathematically self-consistent structures are physically real (a form of all-possible-worlds-actually-exist theory). Tegmark conjectures that all and only computable and decidable (in Gdel's sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and helps explain why our physical laws appear so simple. What makes Tegmark's approach highly interesting is that he takes the first steps towards making such a theory quantitative and capable of generating empirically testable predictions.
"Decoherence and Ontology (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love FAPP)", David Wallace, in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory and Reality Wallace, eds. Saunders, S; Barrett, J; Kent, A; Wallace, D, 2010, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Argues that decoherence solves the 'preferred basis problem' with many-worlds quantum mechanics, in the context of an emergent picture of high-level ontology, and that the question 'how many worlds' is a pseudo-question.
"What is Probability?", Simon, Saunders, in Quo Vadis Quantum Mechanics, eds. Elitzur, A; Dolev, S; Kolenda, N., 2005, Springer.
Argues that the 'probability problem' in Everettian QM can be solved, and that probability actually fits more naturally into EQM than into a one-world view.
Saunders, Simon & Wallace, David, "Branching and uncertainty", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59(3): 293-305, 2008.
Proposes a way of making sense of self-locating uncertainty in Everettian QM.
"The Many-Worlds FAQ", Mike Price, 1995.
Frequently asked questions about the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. A classic usenet document. One frequently asked question it omits is: "What has Mike been doing after he wrote this document (his previous active Internet presence having ended abruptly)?" Answer: Playing chess.